From top to bottom and from left to right.
Generalfeldmarschall von-Rundstedt.
Feldmarschall Rommel.
Generaloberst Friedrich Dollmann, Generaloberst Hans von Salmuth.
General der Artillerie Erich Marcks, Gen.d.Pz.Tr. Adolf Kuntzen.
Gen.Lt. Dietrich Kraiss, Gen.Lt. Wihelm Richte, Gen.Lt. Josef Reichert.

Commanding Army Group B, Rommel was directly subordinate to Generalfeldmarschall von-Rundstedt. But his nomination on 3rd November 1943, by Hitler Inspector-General of Defences in the West reduced the authority of von-Rundstedt.  Effectively, as Inspector, he reported directly to Hitler.
The rivalry between Rommel and von Rundstedt was worsened by their holding two different strategic visions for the defence of Fortress Europe.
In short, von Rundstedt did not believe the Atlantic Wall would be effective other than for the purposes of propaganda.  Rommel however
Firmly believed that if when the invasion came, it would be “the longest day” and it would be necessary to throw the invaders back into the sea, otherwise it would be the beginning of the defeat of Germany.
Generalfeldmarschall von Rundstedt firmly believed in the principle of tactical mobility and counted on a powerful counter attack on the bridgeheads using his reserve. Feldmarschall Rommel however, thought it would be dangerous to allow the Allies to gain a bridgehead.
Contrary to von Rundstedt’s idea Rommel wanted to move his forces closer to the coast to repel any invasion on the beaches themselves. It was this that convinced him to deploy all his innovative defensive systems on the beaches.  In this sense it accelerated the construction of the Atlantic Wall.

In March 1942, notably after the successful raid on the night of 27th/28th February 1942 (organized  by Lord Mountbatten’s organisation) on the Würzburg Radar Station at Bruneval (at Cap Antifer near Le Havre) Hitler decided to reinforce his defences in the West. Control of a big port was judged essential if an invasion were to succeed. In Normandy only Le Havre and Cherbourg had been fortified but after the Bruneval raid Hitler initiated a colossal programme for the defence of the coastline. This set the pattern for future Atlantic Wall Directives, notably a continuous line of fire along the coast and to house the maximum number of artillery pieces inside protective concrete bunkers…
This enormous programme was given to the Todt Organisation and the arrival in November 1943 of Feldmarschall Rommel, in the newly created role of Inspector General of the Defences in the West, indicates exactly at what point the Atlantic Wall became a strategic issue for the German High Command. Rommel worked incessantly to accelerate the works in the Atlantic Wall and install the traps and obstacles on the beaches and their hinterland in Normandy. Passionate about landmines, he showed particular ingenuity in their utilisation…

Feldmarschall Rommel inspector-General of Defences in the West and Commander in Chief of Army Group B twice visited Merville.
His first visit to the Merville Battery took place on the 6th March 1944 and the second in May 1944. For him, the works were not progressing quickly enough, and neither was he impressed by the tensions between the German Navy and German Army. More pressure was placed on the Todt Organisation, which rippled through to forced labour (Service Travail Obligatoire S.T.O.).
Concrete was poured by day and by night under floodlights. Merville and its neighbouring communes were soon to suffer the determination of Rommel, who wanted his defensive system finished in the least time possible.
The intensification of demands and requisitions became part of Rommel’s stubborn will to throw the invaders back into the sea when they were at their most vulnerable.
It was necessary to reinforce all natures of obstacles on the beaches and to implant in the hinterland, posts that were linked by barbed wire and mined at the top. These were the legendary ”Rommel’s Asparagus” and were designed to counter airborne troops, particularly gliders.
Erwin Rommel also flooded the marshes in the low lying land to the East of Merville by damming the mouth of the River Dives. He did the same in the marshes behind Utah Beach in the American Sector.  The flooded lands cost the lives of many paratroops from the 9th Battalion the Parachute Regiment.

As was the norm on the Atlantic Wall, the Todt Organisation was in charge of the construction of the Merville Battery.
The Todt Organisation (named after its founder, Civil Engineer Fritz Todt) sub-contracted the work to a firm called Rittman from the nearby town of Houlgate. As elsewhere, local labour and foreign workers were employed.
The first casemate to be constructed was No 1, a type H611, and the most important of the four to be built. Later would follow casemates 2, 3 and 4, which were type 669.
Casemate type 611 needed 1400 m³ of concrete, compared to 500 m³ for the 669. It also needed 800 m³ of soil to be excavated and 70 tonnes of steel to reinforce it. This enormous construction would be covered in soil to blend in with its environment for camouflage. It resembled a huge burial mound.
The casemates were followed by the construction of command bunker, a personnel bunker, magazines, platform for the anti-aircraft gun, tobruks for machine guns, various outbuildings and shelters and a substantial anti-tank ditch in front of the casemates (which was never finished because it was planned to encircle the whole site). Minefields and barbed wire entanglements complemented the protective works.
Following Feldmarschall Rommel’s visit to Merville on 6th March 1944 the Todt Organisation was instructed to work significantly faster, in order to put the two howitzers still in open emplacements under cover. The two remaining casemates were completed in May 1944.

The Redoubt, built in 1779 in according to the design of Vauban, keeps guard on the beach at Franceville, emphasising the importance of the site.
Not for nothing did the Germans turn this same area into a fortified place, because it controlled the maritime access to Caen.
Feldmarschall Rommel, in addition to the heavy artillery already installed, had cables stretched across the estuary to bar unwanted access to Caen. What is more, Erwin Rommel when on the heights of Amfréville situated on the East of the Orne declared, “this area is the key for the invasion of France and hence towards Germany”.
It was, therefore, no mean task for the 6th Airborne Division, who were to take and hold this strategic position which would become both a shield towards the East and the pivot for the future advancement of the Allies.

The 716th Infantry Division, in summer 1942, was stationed in Normandy on the coastal sector extending from the Vire in the west to the Dives in the East.
This Division was commanded by Generalleutnant Wilhem Richter at his Headquarters in Caen as shown in the above diagram.
As can be seen on the organisation chart above, 716 ID was part of LXXXIV Corps, commanded by General der Artillerie Erich Marcks, and then the 7th Army, commanded by Generaloberst Friedrich Dollmann.
716 ID positioned its two infantry regiments on its coastal sector, Grenadier-Regiment 736 in the East (from the Dives to Courseulles) and Grenadier-Regiment 726 in the West (from Courseulles to Grandcamp). The HQ of Grenadier-Regiment 736 was in Colleville (named Hillman by the Allies). The three Battalions of GR 736 were stationed to the West of the Orne.
Ost-Batallion 642 comprised Russian soldiers from the Eastern Front enlisted into the Wehrmacht. The Ost-Batallion was reassigned to 716 ID in 1944. It therefore became the IV Battalion of GR 736 and its HQ was at Amfréville.
Finally, the 716th ID contained Artillery Regiment 1716. The 1./AR 1716 was located east of the Orne and was the Merville Battery. The Forward Observation Post of the Merville Batterie was manned by a Section of 3./GR 736.

At the beginning of 1944, the Merville Battery was commanded by Hauptman Karl-Heinrich Wolter. His deputy was Rudi Schaaf. They were supported by one other officer and two non-commissioned officers (NCOs). Peter Timp was the observation officer, Johannes Buskotte was the Sergeant-Major and Sergeant Fritz Waldmann was responsible for the aiming and firing of the Battery’s guns.
On 19th May 1944, Hauptman Wolter was with his mistress. A heavy bombardment targeted the Merville Battery during the hours of darkness and destroyed the building where the Hauptman and his mistress were spending the night. The Merville Battery therefore lost its commander.
A successor, Leutnant Raimund Steiner was nominated to be the new Merville Battery Commander.

The soldiers of the Merville Battery comprised 80 Artillery soldiers (Gunners) of 1./AR 1716 and 50 Engineers. Sergeant-Major Johannes Buskotte was in charge. His battle station was in the centre of the Battery site, inside the Command Bunker. This bunker was linked by armoured underground telephone cables to Leutnant Steiner in the Forward Observation Bunker on the beach at Franceville.
The Battery’s fire power came from its four 100 mm howitzers, inside their protective casemates. Weight: 2 900 kg. Maximum Range 10 km. Weight of Shell: 16 kg. Maximum Rate of Fire: 8 rounds per minute (per howitzer).
Its defences comprised minefields, a double system of barbed wire entanglements, tobruks, a 20mm anti-aircraft gun which could also be used at ground targets, a significant anti-tank ditch, trenches and numerous bunkers….Not surprising perhaps that Brigadier James Hill, when he was briefing Lieutenant Colonel Otway, said that this mission was particularly obnoxious.